Skills/ClawHub/audio-translator

audio-translator@2.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "多语种语音翻译技能。支持URL或本地文件输入,自动识别源语言,翻译为目标语言,并生成目标语言的语音文件。支持中文、英文、日文、法文、西班牙文等多种语言互译。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher okgptai · publishing for 242 daysInstalls 1,348Last detonated 56 min ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_deps.sh:36 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt install -y ffmpegFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/translate.sh:91 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "$TEMP_DIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_deps.sh:35 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install_deps.sh:3 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# 不再使用 curl | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/install_deps.sh:16 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceecho " /bin/bash -c \"\$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)\""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install_deps.sh:3 · Remote installer piped to shell# 不再使用 curl | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/translate.sh:306 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filescp "$TEMP_DIR/translated_text.txt" "$TEXT_OUTPUT_PATH"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/translate.sh:302 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files$PYTHON_BIN "$TEMP_DIR/tts.py" "$TEMP_DIR/translated_text.txt" "$OUTPUT_PATH" "$TTS_VOICE"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/translate.sh:272 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$TEMP_DIR/translate.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈581 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim okgptai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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