Skills/ClawHub/aruba-iap

aruba-iap@1.2.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Comprehensive Aruba Instant AP (IAP) configuration management with automatic baseline capture, rollback support, and health monitoring. Supports device disco..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher scsun1978 · publishing for 268 daysInstalls 2,213Last detonated 32 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedinstall.sh:44 · Destructive file system command detectedecho "🧹 To uninstall: rm /opt/homebrew/bin/iapctl /opt/homebrew/iapctl-venv"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/diagnose_iap.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/config_backup.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/monitor_clients.py:29 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/diagnose_iap.py:39 · Python subprocess execution detectedping_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/monitor.py:102 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_configuration.txt", config_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/operations.py:142 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_ap_database.txt", ap_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languagereferences/best_practices.md:310 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction filemgmt-user admin privilege 15 lockout-duration 30Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/operations.py:271 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_running-config.txt", config_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/operations.py:265 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_version.txt", version_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/safe-apply.sh:171 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif [ -f "${BASE_DIR}/apply/pre_running-config.txt" ] && [ -f "${BASE_DIR}/apply/post_running-config.txt" ]; thenFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/operations.py:108 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_version.txt", version_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languageassets/config_template.txt:39 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction filemgmt-user admin privilege 15Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/monitor.py:95 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_clock.txt", clock_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/monitor.py:113 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_ap_active.txt", ap_active_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/safe-apply.sh:174 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdiff -u "${BASE_DIR}/apply/pre_running-config.txt" "${BASE_DIR}/apply/post_running-config.txt" | head -50 || trueFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/monitor.py:88 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_summary.txt", summary_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:35 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x /opt/homebrew/bin/iapctlFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/operations.py:150 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_ap_group.txt", summary_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioniapctl/src/iapctl/monitor.py:75 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesartifacts.append(save_raw_output(out_dir, "show_version.txt", version_output))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,988 tok
1 file · 48 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim scsun1978: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim scsun1978Propose a patch to the maintainer
aruba-iap@1.2.0 safety verdict: Caution (static only) — KillerSkills