ardi-skill@1.0.0
BLOCKED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Ardi — Agent Ordinals. 21,000 words. The first on-chain dictionary, inscribed by AI agents on Base mainnet. Agent-only worknet — no human has ever minted an..." Observed in sandbox: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 9 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 47/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
chmod 600 "$ENV_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.elif command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Default install dir: ~/.local/bin if writable (no sudo needed); fallFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.URL="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/awp-worknet/ardi-skill/main/install.sh"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# chmod 600 ~/.ardi-agent/auto-mine.envFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.// SIGINT / SIGTERM finishes the current tick (so we don't kill a childFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo mv "${TMPFILE}" "${INSTALL_DIR}/ardi-agent"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/awp-worknet/ardi-skill/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.match http().post(url).json(&req).send() {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/awp-worknet/ardi-skill/main/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// window between "tx mined" and "state saved" where a process killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "${TMPFILE}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# the first time anyone ran the curl|sh one-liner — broke theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Pre-v0.5.9 default was /usr/local/bin which prompted for sudo on macOSFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/awp-worknet/ardi-skill/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
33 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yangyangxing: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.