Skills/ClawHub/ant-skill-review

ant-skill-review@1.0.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Security scanner for Claude Code Skill packages. Use when the user wants to audit, review, or check the safety of a Skill before installing — e.g. "is this s..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher antaisecuritylab · publishing for 177 daysInstalls 1,002Last detonated 39 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Prompt injection. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.mjs:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Precedence: .env > inherited shell environment > JSON config file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCreate `.env` and fill in your LLM provider details:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:28 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference- Layer 1: Prompt Injection (direct injection, jailbreak, remote prompt loading)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.mjs:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// 2. Load .env with override enabled so project-local .env wins over inherited shell envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:30 · Remote installer piped to shell- Layer 3: Dynamic Code Loading (remote execution via fetch+eval, curl|sh, etc.)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.mjs:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// 3. Build config — precedence: .env > shell env > JSON configFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.mjs:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconsole.error("Error: apiBase (OPENAI_API_BASE) and apiKey (OPENAI_API_KEY) must be configured via environment variables, .env, or config file");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli.mjs:32 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesskill-review -v --log scan.log -o report.json ./my-skill # all outputs separated`;Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,032 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim antaisecuritylab: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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