Skills/ClawHub/amazon-a-plus-module-pack

amazon-a-plus-module-pack@0.2.6

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "Turn seller-supplied selling points into one Amazon A+ module still per point. This A+ page still studio lays out each seller-supplied benefit as an Amazon A+ Content module for the A+ page. Use it for Amazon A+ modules, selling-point modules, and a brand-story A+ graphic." Observed in sandbox: reads credential files, sends data to api.beatra.ai, api.beatra.cn.

Registry ClawHubPublisher beatra-ai · publishing for 92 daysInstalls 621Last detonated 21 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.2.3

vet-skills diff amazon-a-plus-module-pack 0.2.3 0.2.6

This version reaches for something 0.2.3 did not: 4 new hosts (api.beatra.ai, api.beatra.cn, beatra.ai, beatra.cn) · 1 new credential file (~/.beatra/credentials.json). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
api.beatra.ai, api.beatra.cn, beatra.ai, beatra.cn
New credential files
~/.beatra/credentials.json

0.2.3 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 30/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Summary: reads credential files, sends data to api.beatra.ai, api.beatra.cn.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sfilesystemread ~/.beatra/network.json · ~/.beatra · ~/.beatra/.authorize.lock outside project
0.2sfilesystemwrote ~/.beatra/.network.json.1335.e3996a35.tmp · ~/.beatra/.host.json.c16b3498ad805927.tmp · ~/.beatra/.skills.json.1492bf1c31e46ce0.tmp · ~/.beatra/.authorize.lock · ~/.beatra/.installation.json.d28ff5e66030cca3.tmp
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://api.beatra.ai:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://api.beatra.cn:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://api.beatra.ai:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2sprocessexited 1: Beatra authorization service is unreachable
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 2: mcp_client.py: error: the following arguments are required: command
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sfilesystemread ~/.beatra/skills.json · ~/.beatra/credentials.json outside project
0.4sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/mcp_client.py:1014 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"command": f"npx skills update {slug} -p -y (run in {_shell_quote(str(directory))})",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/mcp_client.py:1022 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codereturn None if source is None else {"source": source, "command": f"npx skills update {slug} -g -y"}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,913 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

50 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%

An override rule (credential_read_plus_egress) caps this verdict regardless of the score. The first item below has to go before anything else counts.

  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs.
  2. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim beatra-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim beatra-aiPropose a patch to the maintainer