alipay-pay-for-service@1.0.9-beta1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "支付宝支付服务处理技能。解析收银台链接、提交支付请求、查询支付结果. 当以下任一情况出现时，应当调用本技能处理支付流程： (1) 对话上下文中出现了 cashier*.alipay.com 或 *excashier*.alipay.com 域名的 URL，且用户表现出了支付意愿。 (2) 任何工具、技能或 API..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
npm install @alipay/[email protected] && npx @alipay/[email protected] install-cliFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.No other findings across 604 lines in 2 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.