Skills/ClawHub/alibabacloud-ecs-code-deploy

alibabacloud-ecs-code-deploy@1.0.3

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "基于 aliyun appmanager 一键把项目代码部署到阿里云 ECS 云服务器，覆盖环境预检、询价、部署、日志验证、失败诊断重试全流程。支持 App / AI Agent（LangChain / AutoGen / AgentScope / MCP / FastAPI / Flask / Spring Boot 等），新建或已有 ECS 实例，自动处理分组冲突、zip 解压、余额不足、地域参数透传、重复部署免初始化。触发词：部署到ECS、部署项目到ECS、部署到云服务器、把这个项目部署上去、上线到ECS、把仓库部署到ECS、当前目录部署、阿里云ECS部署、appmanager部署、aliyun appmanager、一键部署App、部署AI Agent、deploy to ECS、code deploy、deploy app、deploy agent、appmanager deploy、ECS code deploy、跑一下这个项目、把代码跑到ECS上、ECS上线。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher sdk-team · joined 12 days agoInstalls 1,238Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-31 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/deploy_toolkit.py:194 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressscripts/deploy_toolkit.py:914 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressscripts/deploy_toolkit.py:914 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deploy_toolkit.py:56 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/deploy_toolkit.py:286 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/deploy_toolkit.py:229 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:426 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:76 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:217 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deploy_toolkit.py:67 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sdk-team: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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