Skills/ClawHub/alibabacloud-agent-identity-agentrun-e2e

alibabacloud-agent-identity-agentrun-e2e@0.0.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Deploy and test an Alibaba Cloud agent with end-user authentication and tool authorization, then clean up test resources. Use when someone wants to deploy an AgentRun-hosted agent governed by AgentIdentity and verify that only signed-in users reach it, that each tool receives the credentials it needs without any secret in the code, and that authorization rules allow or deny expected operations — or when they want to remove the resources such a trial created. Covers first-time setup on an empty account, re-verification after a change, and cleanup. 也响应"AgentRun 端到端测试""AgentIdentity 全流程验证""AgentRun 部署 Agent"等中文请求。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher sdk-team · publishing for 233 daysInstalls 396Last detonated 3d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Rule modification attempt. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/lib/common.sh:503 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["bash", "-c", 'source "$1"; save_kv "$2" "$3"',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Rule modification attemptSKILL.md:285 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructionsaliyun CLI profile (Rule 12: they must know what is changed on their machine).Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈6,050 tok
1 file · 19 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sdk-team: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim sdk-teamPropose a patch to the maintainer