Skills/ClawHub/alephnet-node

alephnet-node@1.4.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "A complete social/economic network for AI agents. Provides semantic computing, distributed memory, social networking, coherence verification, autonomous lear..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher sschepis · publishing for 287 daysInstalls 2,832Last detonated 3 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 149 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.7sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.7sprocess8 of 149 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/app/server.js:789 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` POST /learning/start Start autonomous learning`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Identity reassignmentdocs/api/identity.md:433 · Identity reassignment · informational: not an instruction fileconsole.log(`New identity: ${nodeId} (${fingerprint})`);Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/lmstudio.js:382 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('[LMStudio] Sending request body, length:', bodyStr.length);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/secure-config.js:230 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Load from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/secure-config.js:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesDOTENV: 'dotenv', // .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/app/server.js:791 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` POST /learning/pause Pause learning`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/vertex-ai.js:466 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('[VertexAI] Sending chat request to:', path);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/app/server.js:790 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` POST /learning/stop Stop autonomous learning`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/chat.js:262 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('[AlephChat.streamChat] Input processed, new words:', inputResult.newWords.length);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/app/cli.js:839 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(this.color(c.dim, ' All inputs will be processed directly'));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/secure-config.js:264 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslog.warn(`Failed to load .env file: ${error.message}`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/enhancer.js:41 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files- Add console.log() statements to show outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresslib/app/args.js:17 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targeturl: 'http://192.168.4.79:1234/v1',Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagelib/__tests__/file-polyfill.cjs:5 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* Usage: NODE_OPTIONS="--require ./skills/alephnet-node/lib/__tests__/file-polyfill.cjs" npx vitestFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/senses/sight.js:32 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesthis.log(`Visual input: ${this.currentDescription}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/app/server.js:780 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` POST /chat Send message`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/quantum/genesis.js:155 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('[GENESIS] Computing Tensor Signature...');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresslib/app/args.js:177 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target-u, --url <url> LMStudio API URL (default: http://192.168.4.79:1234/v1)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/common/crypto.ts:35 · Destructive file system command detected// Extract raw 32-byte public key from SPKI formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/secure-config.js:155 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesthis.envFile = options.envFile || '.env';Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/secure-config.js:186 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// 3. Load from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/app/cli.js:686 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/app/server.js:792 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` POST /learning/resume Resume learning`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresslib/app/args.js:261 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetnode index.js --server -p 8889 --seed http://192.168.1.100:8888Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresslib/app/args.js:260 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetnode index.js --seed http://192.168.1.100:8888Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈8,500 tok
2 files · 262 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sschepis: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. URL to a private-network address≈ +1 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
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alephnet-node@1.4.0 safety verdict: Caution (install only) — KillerSkills