Skills/ClawHub/ai-video-maker

ai-video-maker@1.0.15

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Generate, quote, monitor, retrieve, and cancel AI videos through the AI Video Maker API. Use when a user asks an agent to create text-to-video, image-to-video, frame-guided, or reference-guided video; estimate video cost before spending; check API setup or balance; resume an existing generation; or" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher husu · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 1,303Last detonated 2d ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsscripts/connect.mjs:66 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringoutput.write("Paste your API key (hidden), then press Enter: ");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtest/connect.test.mjs:3 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsimport { mkdtemp, rm, stat, readFile, symlink, chmod } from "node:fs/promises";Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/credentials.mjs:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst temporary = join(directory, `.credentials-${randomUUID()}`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Host or code assembled from base64 fragmentstest/connect.test.mjs:112 · Host or code assembled from base64 fragmentsurl.pathname.endsWith(".tgz") ? new Response(Buffer.from([0x1f, 0x8b, 3, 4])) : fetcher(url),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/release.test.mjs:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert.doesNotMatch(files, /\.env|node_modules|\/test\/|verify-release/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,184 tok
1 file · 25 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim husu: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Host or code assembled from base64 fragments≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim husuPropose a patch to the maintainer