ai-mother@1.0.1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "AI Mother - Monitor and manage other AI agents (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, etc.). Use when asked to check AI execution status, supervise AI agents, help stu..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 180 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.kill -9 "$PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.print("[bold cyan]👩👧👦 AI Mother Dashboard[/bold cyan]")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.kill -CONT "$PID"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.emoji: 👩👧👦Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."[bold cyan]👩👧👦 AI Mother Dashboard[/bold cyan]\n"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.kill "$PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.⚠️ **Use judgment:** answer AI permission requests, provide config values, kill processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "👩👧👦 AI Mother Patrol Report"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.console.print("\n[bold cyan]👩👧👦 AI Mother Dashboard[/bold cyan]")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.echo " Suggestion: User can safely kill this process"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "👩👧👦 AI Mother Setup Wizard"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.echo " To kill a specific PID: kill <PID>"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo " 2. Send Ctrl+C: kill -INT $PID"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo " To kill all but one: kill ${PIDS[@]:1}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.TEST_MSG="👩👧👦 AI Mother setup complete! I'll notify you when AI agents need attention."Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.echo " 3. If frozen: kill -9 $PID (last resort)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.