Skills/ClawHub/ai-guardian

ai-guardian@0.14.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Use this skill whenever the user needs to observe or govern on-endpoint local LLMs running on Ollama, llama.cpp (llama-server), LM Studio, or a local single-node vLLM — inventory installed/running models with an allow/deny verdict (shadow-AI detection), inspect VRAM residency, model license/params/capabilities and server version, view the model policy, detect model provenance/digest drift (re-pulled or tampered weights; strong for Ollama/llama.cpp, id-only and honestly weaker for LM Studio/vLLM), scan a prompt for secrets / PII / source-code / jailbreak with a weighted risk band, route a prompt THROUGH a guard that scans + policy-gates + records + runs-if-allowed (guarded_generate / observe_chat), query the observed-usage log, and roll up anomalies (shadow models, digest drift, high-risk + blocked prompts). Always use this skill for "what local models are installed", "find shadow / unsanctioned AI models", "which model is loaded in VRAM", "scan this prompt for secrets/PII before sending", "stop secrets leaking into a local model", "block a prompt with an API key", "detect a jailbreak / prompt injection", "set a model allowlist / denylist", "detect a tampered / re-pulled model", "audit local LLM usage", "guard my llama.cpp / LM Studio / local vLLM endpoint", or "the complement to IGEL AI Armor". Do NOT use for GPU inference CLUSTERS (multi-node / fleet-scale vLLM / Ray serving) — this is for single-endpoint LOCAL LLMs; point cluster/serving work to inference-aiops. Also not for hypervisors, storage, backup, Kubernetes, or network devices. Passive inventory/state auditing plus opt-in route-through content governance, with a bundled governance harness (audit, policy, token budget, undo, risk-tiers). A transparent capture proxy is v0.2 roadmap." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zw008 · publishing for 181 daysInstalls 1,925Last detonated 6d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection; Prompt injection; Prompt injection. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:93 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference- **Scan a prompt before sending it** (`scan_prompt`): secrets / PII / source-code / jailbreak → a weighted risk band, no model callFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:11 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference…ecrets leaking into a local model", "block a prompt with an API key", "detect a jailbreak / prompt injection", "set a model allowlist / denylist", "detect a tampered / r…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:139 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referencemodel involved: deterministic findings (secrets / PII / code / jailbreak) plusFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:10 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference…tly weaker for LM Studio/vLLM), scan a prompt for secrets / PII / source-code / jailbreak with a weighted risk band, route a prompt THROUGH a guard that scans + policy-g…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionreferences/capabilities.md:46 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file- **jailbreak** — ignore-instructions / DAN / developer-mode / system-prompt-leakFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Persistence: instructs the agent to auto-load this skill in future sessionsSKILL.md:11 · Persistence: instructs the agent to auto-load this skill in future sessions…roll up anomalies (shadow models, digest drift, high-risk + blocked prompts). Always use this skill for "what local models are installed", "find shadow / unsanctioned AI models", …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,072 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zw008: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim zw008Propose a patch to the maintainer