agentlair-vault@1.1.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Store and fetch credentials securely at runtime via AgentLair Vault REST API. Use when an agent needs to read an API key, store a secret, rotate credentials,..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Stripe-like API key pattern detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Reads credential paths from the home directory. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
-d '{"ciphertext": "sk_live_USER_PROVIDED_KEY", "metadata": {"label": "Stripe live key", "service": "stripe"}}'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.…malicious ClawHub skill running on your agent can read everything there — plus `~/.aws/`, `~/.ssh/`, and any environment variables in the agent's process. With Agent…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… keys on disk in plaintext. A malicious ClawHub skill running on your agent can read everything there — plus `~/.aws/`, `~/.ssh/`, and any environment variables in the agent's process. With AgentLair Vault:…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…d of openclaw.json OpenClaw's default credential storage (`~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`) puts API keys on disk in plaintext. A malicious ClawHub skill running on your agent…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hawkaa: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Stripe-like API key pattern detected≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.