Skills/ClawHub/agentic-cli-coding

agentic-cli-coding@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Use this skill for any task that involves reading, understanding, searching, or modifying source code in a project — across JavaScript, TypeScript, Vue, Reac... You can see every single script that's in this. This does not call a remote script at all. You might have to run npm update. That's not a security vulnerability. CallHub sucks at this security scanning." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher encryptshawn · publishing for 201 daysInstalls 986Last detonated 6d ago
$clawhub install agentic-cli-coding
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Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/.local/bin/oce
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sfilesystemwrote ~/.local/bin/oce
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:23 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$WRAPPER"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

No other findings across 3,603 lines in 29 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,580 tok
1 file · 29 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.