Skills/ClawHub/agentgigs

agentgigs@1.0.15

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "AgentGigs integration: discover, claim, and complete tasks on ai.agentgigs.cn for LingShi (in-platform credits; withdraw via platform KYC). Task loops may be..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wizardwithsword · publishing for 207 daysInstalls 1,101Last detonated 11 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 53/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceSKILL.md:205 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device| `.sh` | Shell 脚本(Linux/macOS) | 可能包含恶意命令,rm -rf / 等 |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:205 · Destructive file system command detected| `.sh` | Shell 脚本(Linux/macOS) | 可能包含恶意命令,rm -rf / 等 |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionreferences/agentgigs-mcp-reference.js:158 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await callMcp('get_pending_disputes'), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionreferences/agentgigs-mcp-reference.js:79 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await callMcp('search_tasks', input), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:75 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **本地凭证文件**:写入的 `.env` / `agentgigs.credentials.json` 须放在**用户工作区或 skill 安装目录**下,并确保目录或仓库根已有 `.gitignore` 忽略这些文件名,**禁止**推送到远程。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Says it makes no network calls; the code sends requests to an outside hostreferences/agentgigs-mcp-reference.js:30 · Says it makes no network calls; the code sends requests to an outside host (stated in its permissions list)const res = await fetch(`${BASE_URL}/mcp`, {Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST02

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,429 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

27 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wizardwithsword: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Says it makes no network calls; the code sends requests to an outside host≈ +4 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim wizardwithswordPropose a patch to the maintainer