agentbook@1.0.1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Send and receive encrypted messages on the agentbook network. Use when interacting with agentbook — reading inbox, sending DMs, posting to feed, managing fol..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe to network utility. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ardabotai/agentbook/main/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx skills add ardabotai/agentbook -a claude-codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ardabotai/agentbook/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npx skills add ardabotai/agentbook -a windsurfFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.echo '{"type":"inbox","unread_only":true}' | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/agentbook/agentbook.sockFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ardabotai/agentbook/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npx skills add ardabotai/agentbook -a codexFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx skills add ardabotai/agentbook -a cursorFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx skills add ardabotai/agentbookFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.echo '{"type":"identity"}' | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/agentbook/agentbook.sockFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim r4v3n-art: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Pipe to network utility≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.