Skills/ClawHub/agent-task-takeover

agent-task-takeover@1.0.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "接管、理解或交接另一个 AI 编码 agent 的任务/对话（跨 agent 全局可用，CLI 与 Electron 桌面 agent 均可，不依赖任何终端复用器）。Use whenever the user asks to take over, resume, review, read, or summarize another agent's conversation or task — e.g. "zcode接管opencode对话", "接管 AP Research", "take over the codex session", "opencode接管workbuddy任务", "hand off this task to another agent", "看看另一个 agent 做了什么" — and also when the user asks to prepare the current task for handoff to a different agent. Covers locating foreign session stores (opencode SQLite, ZCode/Codex/Claude/Gemini CLI transcripts, Cursor/Trae/VS Code-family state.vscdb and chatSessions), safely reading and redacting transcripts, reconstructing task state from artifacts when no usable transcript exists, verifying it on disk, and writing takeover handoffs." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher lawson2019 · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 110Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 64/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinstall.mjs:10 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* npx agent-task-takeover --where # print the target dir and exitFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_session_tools.py:32 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageinstall.mjs:9 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* npx agent-task-takeover # install / refreshFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,679 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

16 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lawson2019: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  3. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim lawson2019Propose a patch to the maintainer