Skills/ClawHub/agent-spawner

agent-spawner@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Spawn a new OpenClaw agent through conversation. Uses official Docker setup and non-interactive onboarding, carries over API keys, tools, plugins, and skills..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher austineral · publishing for 273 daysInstalls 2,394Last detonated 18 min ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collects environment variables by secret-like names; Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:111 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash -s -- --no-onboardFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Collects environment variables by secret-like namesSKILL.md:15 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesenv | grep -iE 'API_KEY|TOKEN'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescat ~/.openclaw/.env 2>/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:111 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash -s -- --no-onboardFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,390 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim austineral: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Collects environment variables by secret-like names≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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