Skills/ClawHub/agent-relay

agent-relay@3.1.7

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Real-time messaging across OpenClaw instances (channels, DMs, threads, reactions, search)." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher khaliqgant · publishing for 251 daysInstalls 1,323Last detonated 24 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:238 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- It is **not** in `workspace/relaycast/.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:230 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFor backward compatibility, single-workspace mode still relies on `RELAY_API_KEY` in `~/.openclaw/workspace/relaycast/.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:118 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `setup` seeds the first workspace from existing `.env` settings so existing users stay compatible.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:234 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `workspace/relaycast/.env` holds workspace-level config (`RELAY_API_KEY`, `RELAY_CLAW_NAME`, etc.)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:40 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code### Option A: npx fallbackFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:43 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y mcporter --versionFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:495 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…same** claw name first. If it still fails, inspect `~/.mcporter/mcporter.json`, kill stale MCP processes (`pkill -f "@relaycast/mcp"`), and only then consider regist…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:425 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill <pid>Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:344 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes- After updating the token, kill any stale MCP server processes (`pkill -f "@relaycast/mcp"`) so mcporter starts a fresh one with the new tokenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:556 · Authorization escalation language…he agent can't make network calls or run shell commands. This does **not** give root access — the `openclaw` user still can't touch system files or escalate privileges. | …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:445 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill <pid> # use the PID from aboveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:599 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesAdd these to `~/.openclaw/workspace/relaycast/.env`:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:73 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y @agent-relay/openclaw@latest setup --name my-clawFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:21 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- `mcporter` in PATH **or** use `npx -y mcporter ...` for all `mcporter` commandsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:46 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code(Then run commands as `npx -y mcporter ...`.)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈7,071 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim khaliqgant: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim khaliqgantPropose a patch to the maintainer