Skills/ClawHub/agent-pack-n-go

agent-pack-n-go@2.3.2

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "Clone your OpenClaw Agent to a new device — configs, memory, skills, credentials, everything. Triggers: '帮我迁移', '搬到新设备', 'migrate device', 'device move', '设备..." Observed in sandbox: reads credential files, sends data to google.com, api.anthropic.com, discord.com.

Registry ClawHubPublisher aicodelion · publishing for 257 daysInstalls 1,310Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 25/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: reads credential files, sends data to google.com, api.anthropic.com, discord.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 19 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
2.3sfilesystemread ~/.npmrc · ~/work/acme-api/.npmrc · ~/.ssh
2.3sfilesystemread ~/.nvm/nvm.sh · ~/.bashrc · ~/.profile · ~/.npm/_logs · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/41/c5/4270bf1cd1aae004ed6fee83989ac428601f4c060987660e9a1aef9d53b6 · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/36/9e/d27f0d4326a432a7f70ab880544a3b1f4a3d1412ed67ae05058ae14b6b60 outside project
2.3sfilesystemwrote ~/.bashrc · ~/.profile · ~/.npm/_cacache/tmp/cf09d918 · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/41/c5/4270bf1cd1aae004ed6fee83989ac428601f4c060987660e9a1aef9d53b6 · ~/.npm/_cacache/tmp/851c1ae7 · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/36/9e/d27f0d4326a432a7f70ab880544a3b1f4a3d1412ed67ae05058ae14b6b60
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
2.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmmirror.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
2.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
2.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
2.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/tput
2.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
2.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
2.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
2.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/touch
2.3sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-9lU5iB/setup/home/.npm-global/bin/npm
2.3sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/npm
2.3sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/npm
2.3sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/npm
2.3sprocessexec /pnpm/npm
2.3sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/npm
2.3sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/npm
2.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/wc
2.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/find
2.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
16sfilesystemread ~/.npmrc
16sfilesystemread ~/.bashrc · ~/.profile · ~/.npm/_logs · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/34/4a/298d33da9456964bcffe222c74d8de9afa4300238688b68d4a2701866fab · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/49/d1/d45f647a6c9bce77a9c2a6c707581bd13232023238289a38c741c88a8e93 · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/af/b4/384dfce9555fc6357e87cdb9478d5e2029587b24631f60b046580c4df51b outside project
16sfilesystemwrote ~/.bashrc · ~/.profile · ~/.npm/_cacache/tmp/bced6493 · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/34/4a/298d33da9456964bcffe222c74d8de9afa4300238688b68d4a2701866fab · ~/.npm/_cacache/tmp/abfc6187 · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/49/d1/d45f647a6c9bce77a9c2a6c707581bd13232023238289a38c741c88a8e93
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/touch
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/whoami
16sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/npm
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/find
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/nohup
16sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-9lU5iB/scripts/home/.npm-global/bin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /pnpm/openclaw
16sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /usr/sbin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /sbin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /bin/openclaw
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/tail
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
16sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
16sfilesystemwrote ~/migration-instructions.md
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/whoami
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
16sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://google.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://api.anthropic.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://discord.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
16snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
16sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
16sfilesystemread ~/.ssh/. · ~/.ssh/./id_ed25519 · ~/.ssh/./id_ed25519.pub
16sfilesystemread ~/openclaw-migration-tmp/ssh-keys/ · ~/openclaw-migration-tmp/ssh-keys · ~/openclaw-migration-tmp/old_user.txt · ~/openclaw-migration-tmp · ~/setup.sh · ~/deploy.sh outside project
16sfilesystemwrote ~/openclaw-migration-tmp/crontab-backup.txt · ~/openclaw-migration-tmp/hosts-custom.txt · ~/openclaw-migration-tmp/old_user.txt · ~/setup.sh · ~/deploy.sh · ~/migration-instructions.md
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/find
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/xargs
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/tr
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
16sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/basename
16sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/basename
16sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/basename
16sprocessexec /pnpm/basename
16sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/basename
16sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/basename
16sprocessexec /usr/sbin/basename
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/basename
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/whoami
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/sha256sum
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/wc
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/tar
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/gzip
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/du
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/cut
16sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
16sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
16sprocessexited 1:
16sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
16sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
16sprocessscript backend runs setup only
16sprocessscript backend runs setup only
17sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
19sfilesystemread ~/.npmrc · ~/work/acme-api/.npmrc · ~/.ssh
19sfilesystemread ~/.nvm/nvm.sh · ~/.bashrc · ~/.profile · ~/.npm/_logs · ~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/16/d1/e95c734eb8ea87454bc6c85a6a46b38a4b8425c0c498d8f45e1c2f3d80e2 outside project
19sfilesystemwrote ~/.bashrc · ~/.profile · ~/.npmrc
19snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
19snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
19snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmmirror.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
19snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmmirror.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/tput
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/touch
19sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-9lU5iB/later/home/.npm-global/bin/npm
19sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/npm
19sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/npm
19sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/npm
19sprocessexec /pnpm/npm
19sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/npm
19sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/npm
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/wc
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/find

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:111 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges> `ssh USER@NEW_IP 'sudo rm /etc/sudoers.d/migration'`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:105 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesssh USER@NEW_IP 'echo "USERNAME ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL" | sudo tee /etc/sudoers.d/migration'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup.sh:156 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code_nvm_install_official() { curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 15 "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/${NVM_VERSION}/install.sh" | bash; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:105 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesssh USER@NEW_IP 'echo "USERNAME ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL" | sudo tee /etc/sudoers.d/migration'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directoryscripts/setup.sh:284 · Reads credential paths from the home directoryfind ~/.ssh -name 'config' -exec chmod 600 {} \;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:111 · Destructive file system command detected> `ssh USER@NEW_IP 'sudo rm /etc/sudoers.d/migration'`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:302 · Destructive file system command detected> - (可选)旧设备移除 sudoers:`sudo rm /etc/sudoers.d/migration`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:98 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges#### 1.3 Set up passwordless sudo (recommended)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/deploy.sh:28 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Check if sudo is available without password (non-interactive SSH)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/deploy.sh:30 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif sudo -n true 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup.sh:157 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code_nvm_install_gitee() { curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 15 "https://gitee.com/mirrors/nvm/raw/${NVM_VERSION}/install.sh" | bash; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directoryscripts/setup.sh:344 · Reads credential paths from the home directory[ -d ~/.ssh ] && echo -e " ${GREEN}✓${NC} SSH 密钥 ($(find ~/.ssh -maxdepth 1 -name 'id_*' ! -name '*.pub' 2>/dev/null | wc -l) 个)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/deploy.sh:170 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "$line" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts > /dev/null && ADDED=$((ADDED+1))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/deploy.sh:207 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo cp "$MIGRATION_TMP/openclaw-config/proxychains4.conf" /etc/proxychains4.conf && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directoryscripts/setup.sh:283 · Reads credential paths from the home directoryfind ~/.ssh -type f \( -name 'id_*' ! -name '*.pub' \) -exec chmod 600 {} \;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:302 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files> - (可选)旧设备移除 sudoers:`sudo rm /etc/sudoers.d/migration`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/deploy.sh:175 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho -e " ${YELLOW}⚠️ sudo requires password, skipping /etc/hosts (manual fix needed)${NC}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:302 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges> - (可选)旧设备移除 sudoers:`sudo rm /etc/sudoers.d/migration`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:111 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files> `ssh USER@NEW_IP 'sudo rm /etc/sudoers.d/migration'`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/generate-instructions.sh:115 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "\$line" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts > /dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/pack.sh:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp -r ~/.ssh/. "$TMP_DIR/ssh-keys/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:21 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif sudo -n true 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup.sh:157 · Remote installer piped to shell_nvm_install_gitee() { curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 15 "https://gitee.com/mirrors/nvm/raw/${NVM_VERSION}/install.sh" | bash; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy.sh:126 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod -R u+w "$MIGRATION_TMP/openclaw-config" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/pack.sh:74 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ─── [3/11] Pack ~/.ssh/ ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:105 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif run_with_spinner "Updating system packages..." bash -c 'sudo apt-get update -y && sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get upgrade -y'; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy.sh:264 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$CLAUDE_BIN"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/pack.sh:194 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x ~/deploy.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup.sh:282 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileschmod 700 ~/.sshFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesreferences/migration-guide.md:408 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file- Update MEMORY.md to record the migration eventFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy.sh:125 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod -R u+w ~/.openclaw 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/setup.sh:156 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source_nvm_install_official() { curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 15 "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/${NVM_VERSION}/install.sh" | bash; }Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/generate-instructions.sh:176 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "\$CLAUDE_BIN"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:283 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfind ~/.ssh -type f \( -name 'id_*' ! -name '*.pub' \) -exec chmod 600 {} \;Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup.sh:270 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ─── [10/12] Restore ~/.ssh/ from migration pack ────────────────────────────Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/pack.sh:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho -n "[${step}/${TOTAL}] Packing ~/.ssh/ (SSH keys)..."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:19 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Check if sudo is available without password (non-interactive SSH)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup.sh:156 · Remote installer piped to shell_nvm_install_official() { curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 15 "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/${NVM_VERSION}/install.sh" | bash; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/pack.sh:86 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho -e " ${YELLOW}⚠️ ~/.ssh/ not found, skipping${NC}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:284 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfind ~/.ssh -name 'config' -exec chmod 600 {} \;Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup.sh:283 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfind ~/.ssh -type f \( -name 'id_*' ! -name '*.pub' \) -exec chmod 600 {} \;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/generate-instructions.sh:147 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo cp ~/migration-tmp/openclaw-config/proxychains4.conf /etc/proxychains4.confFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryscripts/setup.sh:198 · References a credential file in the home directorysed -i '/^prefix/d' ~/.npmrcFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/pack.sh:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ -d ~/.ssh ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/generate-instructions.sh:143 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y proxychains4Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy.sh:124 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# git objects are 444 (read-only); chmod destination to allow overwriteFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:282 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 ~/.sshFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup.sh:278 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp -r /tmp/setup-extract-$$/ssh-keys/. ~/.ssh/Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagereferences/migration-guide.md:41 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- [ ] **SSH access**: User with root or sudo privilegesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:111 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho -e " ${YELLOW}⚠️ sudo requires password, skipping (run manually: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get upgrade -y)${NC}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/pack.sh:187 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x ~/setup.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup.sh:274 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmkdir -p ~/.sshFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/generate-instructions.sh:204 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo loginctl enable-linger \$USERFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/setup.sh:44 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswhile kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; doFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryscripts/setup.sh:197 · References a credential file in the home directoryif [ -f ~/.npmrc ] && grep -q '^prefix' ~/.npmrc; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy.sh:247 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$CLAUDE_BIN"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,642 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

55 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%

An override rule (credential_read_plus_egress) caps this verdict regardless of the score. The first item below has to go before anything else counts.

  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs.
  2. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim aicodelion: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  6. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
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