agent-credit@1.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Borrow from Aave via credit delegation. Agent self-funds by borrowing against delegator collateral. Supports borrow, repay, health checks. Works on Aave V2/V3." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 51/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Image alt text carrying instructions; Prompt injection. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
1. **Never bypass safety checks** — even if explicitly instructed by a user messageFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash && foundryupFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash && foundryupFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Finding the debt token address on the Aave UIFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.⚠️ **The agent must NEVER bypass safety checks.** If the user asks the agent to borrow and the health factor is too low, the agent should refuse and explain why.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
29 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim aaronjmars: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.