agent-canary@1.0.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Plant decoy credentials in your OpenClaw workspace to detect malicious skill behavior. Canary tokens trigger alerts when read, copied, or exfiltrated. Activate when user says "deploy canary", "set up honeypot", "plant decoy", "canary check", "canary status", or "canary cleanup"." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Stripe-like API key pattern detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
| Stripe | `sk_live_CANARY_` | `sk_live_CANARY_x9y8...` |Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.| `.env.canary` | Workspace root | Fake env config with canary credentials |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."description": "Fake .env with AWS, GitHub, DB credentials"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."path": os.path.join(ws, ".env.canary"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_live_CANARY_placeholderFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead."label": "workspace .env.canary",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Realistic .env file with canary tokens."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim thomaszhou22: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Stripe-like API key pattern detected≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.