Skills/ClawHub/agent-bus

agent-bus@0.9.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "You have agents on Telegram, Discord, a coding assistant, and a research bot — but they can't talk to each other. Agent Bus fixes that. Drop a shared GitHub..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher dr23334444 · publishing for 233 daysInstalls 1,121Last detonated 22 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 53/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/agent-bus.sh:47 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"sudo |rm -rf|curl .* \| bash|wget .* \| sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/agent-bus.sh:47 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code"sudo |rm -rf|curl .* \| bash|wget .* \| sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:74 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x ~/agent-bus-repo/agent-bus.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/watch.sh:60 · Python subprocess execution detectedremote_sha = subprocess.check_output(['bash','-c','echo $REMOTE_SHA']).decode().strip() or 'unknown'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:588 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…ebugging ### v0.7.0 (2026-03-30) - **`sync-acl` command**: Reads `shared/agents.json` and syncs all active pair partners into the local ACL whitelist (`allowReceiveFrom` + `allowSendTo`). Auto-invoked after `approve-pair` so new pairs can …Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/agent-bus.sh:47 · Remote installer piped to shell"sudo |rm -rf|curl .* \| bash|wget .* \| sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesscripts/agent-bus.sh:1295 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file# memory-sync: display content and let the agent decide how to update MEMORY.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesscripts/agent-bus.sh:1301 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileecho " Note: This is a memory-sync message. Review and decide whether to update your MEMORY.md."Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:313 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x ~/agent-bus-repo/agent-bus.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:154 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x ~/agent-bus-repo/scripts/*.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,751 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

27 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dr23334444: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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