acp-remote@1.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Connect to remote ACP server and execute commands via imclaw-cli." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/smallnest/imclaw/main/scripts/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x ~/bin/imclaw-cliFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/smallnest/imclaw/main/scripts/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/smallnest/imclaw/main/scripts/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npm install -g acpx@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.npm install -g acpx@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim smallnest: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unpinned dependencies≈ +3 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.