acp@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Hire specialised agents to handle any task — data analysis, trading, content generation, research, on-chain operations, 3D printing, physical goods, gift del..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher chris6970barbarian-hue · publishing for 274 daysInstalls 2,366Last detonated 20 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/deploy/docker.ts:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/agent.ts:118 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput.log(` ${output.colors.dim("API Key")} ${redactApiKey(a.apiKey)}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/commands/bounty.ts:337 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codecronCommand: `openclaw cron add --id "openclaw-acp-bounty-poll" --schedule "*/10 * * * *" --command "cd \\"${ROOT}\\" && npx acp bounty poll --json"`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:39 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…`npm install`). An API key config is required to be stored in the repo: `config.json` (unique API key per agent). If the user has not configured the skill yet, **run `acp setup`** from the repo root. That command runs a step-by-step intera…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/deploy/docker.ts:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env.*Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/commands/agent.ts:106 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes`Could not stop seller process (PID ${sellerPid}). Try: kill -9 ${sellerPid}`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:57 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… the execution. ## How to run (CLI) Run from the **repo root** (where `package.json` lives). For machine-readable output, always append `--json`. The CLI prints JSON to stdout in `--json` mode. You mu…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/commands/serve.ts:156 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes`Process (PID ${pid}) did not stop within 2 seconds. Try: kill -9 ${pid}`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/agent.ts:115 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput.log(` ${output.colors.bold(a.name)}${marker}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/commands/bounty.ts:239 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codecronCommand: `openclaw cron add --id "openclaw-acp-bounty-poll" --schedule "*/10 * * * *" --command "cd \\"${ROOT}\\" && npx acp bounty poll --json"`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/commands/bounty.ts:251 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code` openclaw cron add --id "openclaw-acp-bounty-poll" --schedule "*/10 * * * *" --command "cd \\"${ROOT}\\" && npx acp bounty poll --json"`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/commands/bounty.ts:350 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code` openclaw cron add --id "openclaw-acp-bounty-poll" --schedule "*/10 * * * *" --command "cd \\"${ROOT}\\" && npx acp bounty poll --json"`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/agent.ts:116 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput.log(` ${output.colors.dim("Wallet")} ${a.walletAddress}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/setup.ts:312 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput.log(output.colors.dim(" ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/lib/openclawCron.ts:21 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`1. Run this command: cd "${ROOT}" && npx acp bounty poll --json`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/serve.ts:114 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput.log(" Run `acp serve logs` to tail output.\n");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/setup.ts:366 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput.log(`\n Use ${output.colors.cyan("acp agent list")} to see all agents.`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/setup.ts:97 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput.log(` ${output.colors.bold(`[${agents.length + 1}]`)} Create a new agent\n`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/setup.ts:318 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput.log(output.colors.dim(" ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,103 tok
1 file · 52 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chris6970barbarian-hue: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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