Skills/ClawHub/acestep

acestep@1.0.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Use ACE-Step API to generate music, edit songs, and remix music. Supports text-to-music, lyrics generation, audio continuation, and audio repainting. Use thi..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher dumoedss · publishing for 282 daysInstalls 2,996Last detonated 16 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injection attemptapi-reference.md:98 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file| `lyrics` | string | "" | **Full lyrics content** - Pass ALL lyrics without omission. Use `[inst]` for instrumental. Partial/truncated lyrics = incomplete songs |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:221 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…ut printing the actual key. **NEVER use `config --get api_key`** or read `config.json` directly — these would expose the user's API key. The `config --list` command is safe — it automatically masks API keys as `***` in output. ### API Mode…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:166 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- **Linux**: `sudo apt-get install jq` (Debian/Ubuntu) or `sudo dnf install jq` (Fedora)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagapi-reference.md:44 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "<prompt>Jazz with saxophone</prompt><lyrics>[Verse] Hello...</lyrics>"}],Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,666 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dumoedss: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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