academic-pipeline-suite@1.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Complete Academic Research & Writing Suite — One-click installation of the full Academic Pipeline ecosystem with all 8 dependencies. Includes academic-pipeli..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
kill "${PROXY_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Example usage (cross-platform, pass credentials via options JSON)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.TARGET=$(curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:${CDP_PROXY_PORT:-3456}/new?url=https://scholar.google.com" | node -p "JSON.parse(require('fs').readFileSync(0, 'utf8')).targetId")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.kill "${PROXY_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…age and re-run the check ### At Stage 4.5 FINAL INTEGRITY Re-run all 7 modes. Additional rule: any mode that was SUSPECTED at 2.5 must be resolved by 4.5 (CLEAR or user-Overr…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.console.log(`Upload successful (HTTP ${res.statusCode})`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim eric-promax: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.