Skills/ClawHub/3x-ui-vps

3x-ui-vps@1.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Deploy and manage 3X-UI on a root-managed Ubuntu or Debian VPS using Docker Compose, nginx, ACME certificates, SSH panel tunneling, UFW hardening, and Xray V..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher olegtsvetkov · publishing for 240 daysInstalls 1,200Last detonated 22 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 2: add-inbound-client.py: error: the following arguments are required: --panel-url, --username, --password
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexited 1: -h, --help Show this help
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 2: bootstrap-inbound.py: error: the following arguments are required: --panel-url, --username, --password, --public-domain
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.2sprocessexited 1: Open an SSH local port forward to the loopback-bound 3X-UI panel.
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.2sprocessexited 1: Run ssh with optional plain-text password support.
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.3sprocessexited 1: Run safe package and 3X-UI image updates on the remote host.
0.3sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ssh-with-password.sh:54 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "${ASKPASS_SCRIPT}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/bootstrap-host.sh:337 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://get.acme.sh | sh -s email="${ACME_EMAIL:-}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/bootstrap-host.sh:337 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://get.acme.sh | sh -s email="${ACME_EMAIL:-}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/bootstrap-host.sh:296 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/get-docker.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,686 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim olegtsvetkov: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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