Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 68 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 2 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/src/terse/cli.py b/src/terse/cli.py --- a/src/terse/cli.py +++ b/src/terse/cli.py @@ -1755,1 +1755,0 @@ -"""`url` with any userinfo and query string masked: `https://u:pw@h/mcp?token=x` is a @@ -1803,1 +1802,0 @@ -# `--url=https://u:pw@h`, `DATABASE_URL=postgres://u:pw@db`: the value half is
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 0.49.3. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: terse-mcp: URL with embedded credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 68)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.8.1) and scored it **CAUTION 68/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory. - See the findings below. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/terse-mcp/0.49.3 ## Findings with a location - `scripts/bench/corpus/gh_commits.json:1` · URL with embedded credentials — scripts/bench/corpus/gh_commits.json:1 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `src/terse/cli.py:1755` · URL with embedded credentials — src/terse/cli.py:1755 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `src/terse/cli.py:1803` · URL with embedded credentials — src/terse/cli.py:1803 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `scripts/bench/corpus/gh_repo_single.json:1` · URL with embedded credentials — scripts/bench/corpus/gh_repo_single.json:1 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 2 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork inth3shadows/terse --clone && cd terse curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/terse-mcp/0.49.3/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/0.49.3 && git commit -am "terse-mcp: URL with embedded credentials" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/terse-mcp/0.49.3/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.