Propose a patch

Evidence

The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.

diff --git a/src/openstem/lms/client.py b/src/openstem/lms/client.py
--- a/src/openstem/lms/client.py
+++ b/src/openstem/lms/client.py
@@ -703,1 +703,0 @@
-text = body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace").lstrip("").strip()
diff --git a/src/openstem/lms/logs.py b/src/openstem/lms/logs.py
--- a/src/openstem/lms/logs.py
+++ b/src/openstem/lms/logs.py
@@ -39,1 +39,0 @@
-pass
diff --git a/tests/test_lms.py b/tests/test_lms.py
--- a/tests/test_lms.py
+++ b/tests/test_lms.py
@@ -105,1 +105,0 @@
-monkeypatch.setenv("OPENSTEM_LMS_URL", "https://user:[email protected]")
diff --git a/src/openstem/lms/ical.py b/src/openstem/lms/ical.py
--- a/src/openstem/lms/ical.py
+++ b/src/openstem/lms/ical.py
@@ -83,1 +83,0 @@
-text = data.decode("utf-8", errors="replace").lstrip("")

Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 0.4.0. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.

Issue / PR body

Title: openstem-mcp: Hidden zero-width characters detected (KillerSkills verdict caution 65)

## What the honeypot observed
KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.8.1) and scored it **CAUTION 65/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

- See the findings below.

Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/openstem-mcp/0.4.0

## Findings with a location
- `src/openstem/lms/client.py:703` · Hidden zero-width characters detected — src/openstem/lms/client.py:703 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content
- `src/openstem/lms/logs.py:39` · Credential pass-through configuration — src/openstem/lms/logs.py:39 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials
- `tests/test_lms.py:105` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_lms.py:105 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `src/openstem/lms/ical.py:83` · Hidden zero-width characters detected — src/openstem/lms/ical.py:83 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content

## Proposed change
The attached patch removes the 4 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account.

## How this will be verified
Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page.

_Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._