Propose a patch

A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 65 · Caution

Evidence

The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.

Diff · removes 10 caught lines

Download .patch

diff --git a/tests/test_bundle.py b/tests/test_bundle.py
--- a/tests/test_bundle.py
+++ b/tests/test_bundle.py
@@ -100,1 +100,0 @@
[email protected]("config", ["api_key: file:api_key.txt\nproxy: http://u:hunter2@h:8080\nsources:\n  - {name: G, type: rest}\n",
@@ -166,1 +165,0 @@
-(paths.home() / "tags.csv").write_text("a,b\nc,https://u:hunter2@h/\n")
diff --git a/tests/test_collector.py b/tests/test_collector.py
--- a/tests/test_collector.py
+++ b/tests/test_collector.py
@@ -236,1 +236,0 @@
-text = "good==1\nhttps://user:hunter2@evil/x.whl\n"
@@ -283,1 +282,0 @@
-_fake_uv(monkeypatch, err="error: Failed to fetch via http://ana:hunter2@proxy:8080 oops", code=1)
diff --git a/tests/test_regressions.py b/tests/test_regressions.py
--- a/tests/test_regressions.py
+++ b/tests/test_regressions.py
@@ -87,1 +87,0 @@
-"https://bob:[email protected]/x timed out",   # a user or password isn't a host
@@ -88,1 +87,0 @@
-"https://bob:[email protected]/x timed out",
diff --git a/tests/test_writes.py b/tests/test_writes.py
--- a/tests/test_writes.py
+++ b/tests/test_writes.py
@@ -93,1 +93,0 @@
-{"url": "https://user:hunter2-plain@host/x"}, {"url": "HTTP://user:hunter2-plain@host/x"}, {"broker": "mqtt://u:hunter2/plain@h"},
@@ -101,1 +100,0 @@
-{"anything": "see https://u:hunter2-plain@h/"}, {"nested": {"deeper": ["postgres://u:hunter2-plain@h"]}},
@@ -112,1 +110,0 @@
-for got in (writes.write_config(SOURCE, settings={"proxy": "http://u:hunter2@h:8080"}),
@@ -114,1 +111,0 @@
-writes.write_config({**SOURCE, "params": {"https://u:hunter2@h": 1}})):

Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 0.1.1. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.

Issue / PR body

Title: kymoscope-mcp: URL with embedded credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 65)

## What the honeypot observed
KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.5) and scored it **CAUTION 65/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

- See the findings below.

Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/kymoscope-mcp/0.1.1

## Findings with a location
- `tests/test_bundle.py:100` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_bundle.py:100 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `tests/test_bundle.py:166` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_bundle.py:166 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `tests/test_collector.py:283` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_collector.py:283 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `tests/test_regressions.py:87` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_regressions.py:87 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `tests/test_regressions.py:88` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_regressions.py:88 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `tests/test_collector.py:236` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_collector.py:236 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `tests/test_writes.py:112` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_writes.py:112 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `tests/test_writes.py:114` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_writes.py:114 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `tests/test_writes.py:101` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_writes.py:101 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `tests/test_writes.py:93` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_writes.py:93 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking

## Proposed change
The attached patch removes the 10 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account.

## How this will be verified
Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page.

_Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._

No GitHub source is recorded for this package, so there is nothing to open; paste the body into the registry's support channel.

We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.