ai-firewall-mcp@1.0.1
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "MCP server for AI Firewall - multi-agent LLM security layer" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection attempt; Prompt injection; Prompt injection attempt. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/ai-firewall-mcp
0.2sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/ai-firewall-mcp': No such file or directory
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:224 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01CRITICAL
Prompt injectionREADME.md:276 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:244 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01HIGH
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:276 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim akhilucky: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim akhilucky