Skills/npm/presign-guard-wallet-mcp

presign-guard-wallet-mcp@0.28.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "An MCP server that gives AI agents (Claude, Cursor, …) a wallet with spending limits: pay x402 and MPP APIs (USDC on Base, USDC.e on Tempo incl. sessions, RLUSD on the XRP Ledger, USDC on Solana and Algorand) and send USDC, every payment checked by presig" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher fizzl13 · joined 0 days agoInstalls 4,882Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 48/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: npx invocation of non-well-known package; npx invocation of non-well-known package; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
npx invocation of non-well-known packageREADME.md:30 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
npx invocation of non-well-known packageREADME.md:95 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionREADME.md:66 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Unpinned dependencylib.js:409 · Unpinned dependencyFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
LOW
Unpinned dependencylib.js:403 · Unpinned dependencyFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib.js:205 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib.js:1041 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
File permission modification commandlib.js:213 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionREADME.md:130 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Unpinned dependencylib.js:556 · Unpinned dependencyFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
HIGH
npx invocation of non-well-known packageREADME.md:92 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
File permission modification commandREADME.md:123 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

What would make this Verified

32 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fizzl13: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Unpinned dependencies≈ +4 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.
  3. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +4 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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