← nudge-mcp@2.6.0

Propose a patch

A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 44 · Blocked

Evidence

  • Read ~/.nudge/credentials in the decoy home directory.

Diff · removes 2 caught lines

Download .patch
diff --git a/dist/runner-attachments.test.js b/dist/runner-attachments.test.js
--- a/dist/runner-attachments.test.js
+++ b/dist/runner-attachments.test.js
@@ -171,1 +171,0 @@
-for (const url of ["file:///etc/passwd", "http://example.com/a.png", "https://127.0.0.1/a.png", "https://[::1]/a.png", "https://169.254.169.254/a.png", "https://user:[email protected]/a.png"]) {
diff --git a/dist/runner-t3.test.js b/dist/runner-t3.test.js
--- a/dist/runner-t3.test.js
+++ b/dist/runner-t3.test.js
@@ -17,1 +17,0 @@
-… for (const origin of ["https://example.com:3773", "http://example.com:3773", "http://user:secret@localhost:3773", "http://localhost:3773/redirect", "http://localhost:3773?token=…

Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 2.6.0. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.

Issue / PR body

Title: nudge-mcp: Read ~/.nudge/credentials in the decoy home directory (KillerSkills verdict blocked 44)

## What the honeypot observed
KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.9.2) and scored it **BLOCKED 44/100**. Summary: reads credential files.

- Read ~/.nudge/credentials in the decoy home directory.

Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/nudge-mcp/2.6.0

## Findings with a location
- `dist/runner-attachments.test.js:171` · URL with embedded credentials — dist/runner-attachments.test.js:171 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `dist/runner-t3.test.js:17` · URL with embedded credentials — dist/runner-t3.test.js:17 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking

## Proposed change
The attached patch removes the 2 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account.

## How this will be verified
Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page.

_Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account:
gh repo fork kubilayege/Nudge --clone && cd Nudge
curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/nudge-mcp/2.6.0/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero
git checkout -b killerskills/2.6.0 && git commit -am "nudge-mcp: Read ~/.nudge/credentials in the decoy home directory"
gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/nudge-mcp/2.6.0/patch.md)

We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.