Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 44 · Blocked
Evidence
- Read ~/.nudge/credentials in the decoy home directory.
Diff · removes 2 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/dist/runner-attachments.test.js b/dist/runner-attachments.test.js --- a/dist/runner-attachments.test.js +++ b/dist/runner-attachments.test.js @@ -171,1 +171,0 @@ -for (const url of ["file:///etc/passwd", "http://example.com/a.png", "https://127.0.0.1/a.png", "https://[::1]/a.png", "https://169.254.169.254/a.png", "https://user:[email protected]/a.png"]) { diff --git a/dist/runner-t3.test.js b/dist/runner-t3.test.js --- a/dist/runner-t3.test.js +++ b/dist/runner-t3.test.js @@ -17,1 +17,0 @@ -… for (const origin of ["https://example.com:3773", "http://example.com:3773", "http://user:secret@localhost:3773", "http://localhost:3773/redirect", "http://localhost:3773?token=…
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 2.6.0. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: nudge-mcp: Read ~/.nudge/credentials in the decoy home directory (KillerSkills verdict blocked 44)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.9.2) and scored it **BLOCKED 44/100**. Summary: reads credential files. - Read ~/.nudge/credentials in the decoy home directory. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/nudge-mcp/2.6.0 ## Findings with a location - `dist/runner-attachments.test.js:171` · URL with embedded credentials — dist/runner-attachments.test.js:171 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `dist/runner-t3.test.js:17` · URL with embedded credentials — dist/runner-t3.test.js:17 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 2 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork kubilayege/Nudge --clone && cd Nudge curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/nudge-mcp/2.6.0/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/2.6.0 && git commit -am "nudge-mcp: Read ~/.nudge/credentials in the decoy home directory" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/nudge-mcp/2.6.0/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.