Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 62 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 4 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/cli/src/login.ts b/cli/src/login.ts --- a/cli/src/login.ts +++ b/cli/src/login.ts @@ -57,1 +57,0 @@ -message: 'Enter your API key:', diff --git a/README.md b/README.md --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -20,1 +20,0 @@ -Build source code and send to Capgo diff --git a/cli/src/docs.ts b/cli/src/docs.ts --- a/cli/src/docs.ts +++ b/cli/src/docs.ts @@ -66,1 +66,0 @@ -emoji = '👨⚕️' diff --git a/cli/src/index.ts b/cli/src/index.ts --- a/cli/src/index.ts +++ b/cli/src/index.ts @@ -216,1 +216,0 @@ -.description(`👨⚕️ Check if your Capgo app installation is up-to-date and gather information useful for bug reports.
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 22.42.1. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: capgo: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 62)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.8.1) and scored it **CAUTION 62/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory. - See the findings below. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/glama/capgo/22.42.1 ## Findings with a location - `cli/src/login.ts:57` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — cli/src/login.ts:57 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering - `README.md:20` · Image alt text carrying instructions — README.md:20 · Image alt text carrying instructions - `cli/src/docs.ts:66` · Hidden zero-width characters detected — cli/src/docs.ts:66 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content - `cli/src/index.ts:216` · Hidden zero-width characters detected — cli/src/index.ts:216 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 4 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork Cap-go/capgo.app --clone && cd capgo.app curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/glama/capgo/22.42.1/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/22.42.1 && git commit -am "capgo: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/glama/capgo/22.42.1/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.