Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 68 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 2 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/scripts/store-assets.mjs b/scripts/store-assets.mjs
--- a/scripts/store-assets.mjs
+++ b/scripts/store-assets.mjs
@@ -61,1 +61,0 @@
-const page = (body) => `<!doctype html><html><head><meta charset="utf-8"><link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@400;500;600;700&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@500&display=swap" re
@@ -119,1 +118,0 @@
-`<!doctype html><html><head><meta charset="utf-8"><link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@500;650&display=swap" rel="stylesheet"><style>*{margin:0;box-sizing:border-box}body{wi
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of r1. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: agentchrome: URL with embedded credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 68)
## What the honeypot observed
KillerSkills ran **agentchrome@r1** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.7) and scored it **CAUTION 68/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
- See the findings below.
Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/glama/agentchrome/r1
## Findings with a location
- `scripts/store-assets.mjs:119` · URL with embedded credentials — scripts/store-assets.mjs:119 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
- `scripts/store-assets.mjs:61` · URL with embedded credentials — scripts/store-assets.mjs:61 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking
## Proposed change
The attached patch removes the 2 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account.
## How this will be verified
Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page.
_Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork kaijiabo/agentchrome --clone && cd agentchrome curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/glama/agentchrome/r1/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/r1 && git commit -am "agentchrome: URL with embedded credentials" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/glama/agentchrome/r1/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.