Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/rust-mcp-filesystem

rust-mcp-filesystem@r1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "|-" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher rust-mcp-stack · joined 0 days agoInstalls 43,068Last detonated 3 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is rust-mcp-filesystem@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/release.yml:251 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/release.yml:237 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/release.yml:203 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.github/workflows/release.yml:67 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/release.yml:83 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/fs_service/utils.rs:534 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdocs/guide/install.md:3 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.github/workflows/release.yml:67 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdocs/quickstart.md:3 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.github/workflows/release.yml:127 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/release.yml:156 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/release.yml:187 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.github/workflows/release.yml:127 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim rust-mcp-stack: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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