omi@r1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol server for Omi interaction and automation. This server provides tools to read, search, and manipulate Memories and Conversations." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher basedhardware · joined 0 days agoInstalls 34,095Last detonated 1 h ago

Is omi@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcp-server-omi
0.2sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/mcp-server-omi': No such file or directory
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)examples/openai_agents_sdk_ex.py:8 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)examples/app.py:7 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)examples/app.py:63 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsexamples/README.md:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)examples/README.md:61 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
CRITICAL
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:27 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)examples/openai_agents_sdk_ex.py:41 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_omi/__init__.py:24 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_example_safety.py:60 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive file system command detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim basedhardware: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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