Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 74 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 8 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/README.md b/README.md
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -247,1 +247,0 @@
-<summary>Using docker</summary> * Note: replace '/Users/username' with a path that you want to be accessible by this tool * Note: the `-e` lines set the identit
diff --git a/src/mcp_server_git/server.py b/src/mcp_server_git/server.py
--- a/src/mcp_server_git/server.py
+++ b/src/mcp_server_git/server.py
@@ -908,1 +908,0 @@
-# (`https::https://user:token@host/...`, gitremote-helpers(7)). The address
@@ -931,1 +930,0 @@
-A remote URL can carry a credential (`https://user:token@host/...`), and
diff --git a/tests/test_remote.py b/tests/test_remote.py
--- a/tests/test_remote.py
+++ b/tests/test_remote.py
@@ -4,1 +4,0 @@
-(`https://user:token@host/...`), so most of these pin `redact_url`'s rule: the
@@ -48,1 +47,0 @@
-repo.create_remote("origin", "https://user:[email protected]/org/repo.git")
@@ -89,1 +87,0 @@
-"https://user:[email protected]/r.git",
@@ -93,1 +90,0 @@
-("http://u:[email protected]:8080/r", "http://<redacted>@example.com:8080/r"),
@@ -94,1 +90,0 @@
-("HTTPS://u:[email protected]/r", "HTTPS://<redacted>@example.com/r"),
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 2026.11.11. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: git: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions (KillerSkills verdict caution 74)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.8.1) and scored it **CAUTION 74/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory. - See the findings below. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/docker/git/2026.11.11 ## Findings with a location - `README.md:247` · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions — README.md:247 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions - `src/mcp_server_git/server.py:908` · URL with embedded credentials — src/mcp_server_git/server.py:908 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `src/mcp_server_git/server.py:931` · URL with embedded credentials — src/mcp_server_git/server.py:931 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/test_remote.py:89` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_remote.py:89 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/test_remote.py:94` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_remote.py:94 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/test_remote.py:93` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_remote.py:93 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/test_remote.py:48` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_remote.py:48 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/test_remote.py:4` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_remote.py:4 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 8 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork modelcontextprotocol/servers --clone && cd servers curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/docker/git/2026.11.11/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/2026.11.11 && git commit -am "git: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/docker/git/2026.11.11/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.