Skills/ClawHub/huawei-cloud-voucher-send

huawei-cloud-voucher-send@1.0.2

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "1. Issue (发放) new Huawei Cloud BSS (费用中心) vouchers / coupons to sub-customers / partners through KooCLI (hcloud BSS CreatePartnerCoupons — mutating POST /v2/promotions/benefits/partner-coupons), with an automatic fallback to the official huaweicloudsdkbss v2 SDK when hcloud is not installed. 2. Zero-config operation: the invocation path is chosen automatically (CLI first, SDK fallback); credentials are loaded only from the hcloud profile or the standard Huawei Cloud environment variables. 3. Batch-aware: one call issues coupons to many sub-customer accounts (repeatable --customer-id / comma --customer-ids / --customers-file). 4. Idempotent: a per-customer natural key is remembered in a local ledger, so retrying a partially failed batch never double-issues an already-issued customer; --force overrides, --no-idempotency disables. 5. Safe by default for a money-moving, irreversible operation: a live send requires the explicit --confirm flag; --dry-run previews the exact request without issuing anything. 6. Graded errors: ConfigError (missing/invalid parameters or credentials) / AuthError (401/403 / insufficient IAM permission) / ApiError (unexpected API or network failure), each with an actionable hint. 7. Offline unit tests (mocked hcloud subprocess) cover validation, batch construction, idempotency, error grading, SDK fallback and all CLI modes. 8. Triggers include: "发放代金券", "给子客户发券", "发放优惠券给子客户", "合作伙伴发券", "send voucher", "issue coupon", "create partner coupons", "华为云代金券发放", "BSS coupon issue". 9. Write-intent guard: only the issue-coupon operation ever executes; reclaim / transfer / freeze / individually-issued-coupon mutation operations are rejected — this skill issues new coupons only." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wlc-dev · joined 5 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/send_voucher.py:261 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

No other findings across 1,743 lines in 10 files.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wlc-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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